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How do security cooperation planners assess a partner nation?

Updated 26 October 2026Checked against the SAMM: 12 October 2026

Before planners decide what to do with a partner, they assess it. They study the operational and security environment, write down the assumptions they are planning on, decide what role the U.S. Government wants the partner to play, and then judge whether the partner has the capability, the political will and the resources to play it. plans also weigh the partner's economic capabilities and how much equipment it can support, and a needs assessment is a critical part of long-range plans.

How do security cooperation planners assess a partner nation?

planners assess a partner nation by studying its operational and security environment, recording their assumptions, deciding the role the U.S. Government wants it to play, and judging its capability, political will and resources to play that role.

When seeking to understand the operational and security environment, the theater-level planner should focus on regional dynamics. What are the challenges to the theater-strategic end state? What are the roles of regional actors in the strategic balance of power? What are some of the Area of Responsibility () relevant factors that could serve as restraints or constraints on the efforts? An in-depth analysis of these issues is important, and country-level expertise throughout the is central to the planning team during this phase. Fitting these pieces together and figuring out the optimal strategy to influence the situation is the result of operational art and design. A few relevant analysis methods and tools are below:

  • Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats (SWOT)
  • Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL)
  • Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Culture, Technological, and Physical Environment (PMESII-CTP)

Planners should also consider how the national interests of countries, both in and outside the , compete with or support U.S. objectives in the . Furthermore, planners should consider challenges found outside the that can affect the achievement of theater strategic end states, such as transnational threats (e.g., weapons of mass destruction proliferation, illicit trafficking, etc.). Real-world issues do not respect boundaries. Thus, planners account for regional and transnational issues as well as U.S. and partner nation (PN) equities and sensitivities outside their respective as part of a whole-of-government approach.

Both statute and Department of War (DoW) policy require () programs and activities to be planned, monitored and evaluated on the basis of critical assessments of the partner’s capability requirements, baseline information, potential programmatic risks and indicators of efficacy [SAMM ] []. For more information on the DoW Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation requirements, see DoDI 5132.14. For PNs that have an existing Strategy to Capability, Level 1 Strategic Framework, or Level 2 Five-Year Plan(s), these documents provide significant insights into the current relationship with the PNs.

Planners never have all the information required, and planning relies heavily on assumptions. To ensure planning can continue under these circumstances, planners need to fill in their “knowledge gaps” with explicit assumptions. Assumptions should be both valid and necessary. A valid assumption is logical and realistic. A necessary assumption is one that is essential to continue the planning process: planning could not continue without it. Assumptions can span a wide range of topics, including the political conditions and military capabilities of countries in the region and timelines of events. Planners continually review assumptions to ensure validity, and capture all assumptions within their plan so that future planners know what the previous assumptions were.

plans take into account the foreign government's economic capabilities, the support that third parties provide, and overall U.S. and regional conventional arms transfer policies. They also weigh how much military equipment, and of what type, the country can support. plans stress the country's capability to organize, employ and manage the national resources it allocates to defense. Plans should be consistent with the U.S. Government's overall political, economic, technological and national security goals [SAMM ].

While developing the plan, planners should examine various aspects of the operational and security environment as it pertains to the PN. Planners should study relevant geopolitical trends or conditions that influence key audiences in the PN. In the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress wrote in Section 333(b)(2), title 10: “In developing and planning a program to build the capacity of the national security forces of a foreign country… the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of should jointly consider political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical factors, if any, of the foreign country that may impact the effectiveness of the program” [].

Planners should also assess significant internal and external threats to the partner and neighboring nations in the region. Another important consideration is the breadth and complexity of operational demands that these threats impose on PN security capabilities. Planners should identify key security-related opportunities for cooperation, such as the PN’s role in regional organizations. The planners should assess the capabilities and resources of the PN, including its force structure, defense budget, and expenditures on weapons system purchases from the international market. Planners also need to conduct an assessment of the various institutional capabilities of the PN. Finally, planners should consider the goals and activities of other U.S. Government () agencies and other countries and the DoW’s role with respect to their efforts. Planners can use the tools listed above (SWOT, DIMEFIL, PMESII-CTP).

A needs assessment is a critical element of any long-range plan. It lists the items that the believes the country needs to maintain its defense [SAMM ].

Not every country can or should fill every role. One country can play a role in its own internal stability while another contributes troops to United Nations operations; it depends on how the sees these various parts fitting together to achieve the ends. The country planner also reaches out to other country planners in the region to understand how strategies for one PN can affect another.

Planners next look at the institutional and operational capacity and capability of the PN military to play the desired role. This step calls for a general military capabilities study rather than a detailed assessment: What is their operational history? Can the PN self-deploy? Can it even leave garrison? Does it have a joint planning staff? How strong is its logistics capability? Does the PN have respect for rule of law and human rights? Can the United States work with this nation?

Planners need to assess the PN’s political will and stability as well as the capability required to perform the desired role(s). What is the necessary degree of consensus among the political leadership and, more broadly, among civil society for the country to contribute forces to coalition operations or to conduct operations to deter potential aggressors in the region? What operational capability and capacity does the PN require to perform these and/or other desired roles? Finally, what institutional capacity is needed to sustain the required operational capability and capacity? Specific institutional factors to consider include the following: degree of legitimacy and legal status; leadership and planning capability; decision making; resource management; human resources; equipment and logistics; and integrating mechanisms. Planners should use the (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities & Policy) framework to identify specific operational capability and capacity requirements [SAMM , ].

Planners need to assess a PN’s overall strategic willingness to play the desired role. Does the PN have both the political and civil society consensus? Critical factors include political leanings of political and military, public opinion vis-à-vis the role, national priorities, fiscal realities, security interests, military and political aspirations, and historic role in the region. Additionally, the degree of political accountability of the government and civilian control of the military will bear on the problem. Conversely, if the desired role is counter to the national interests of the PN (from the PN’s perspective), the plan takes this into account. There is no need to expend limited resources on roles for which the PN has no desire.

The Secretary of is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of programs, including whether there will be a program or sale for a particular country and, if so, its size and scope [SAMM ]. In each country, the leads the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). The ICS sets common mission goals and objectives through coordinated, collaborative planning among the Department of State and the other agencies with programs in the country [SAMM ]. Under the direction of the President, the shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in the country. The exceptions are Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander [].

The National Security Council () is the organization that oversees the interagency process. The Secretary of War (SecWar) is a member of the ; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff () attends and participates in its meetings when the President so designates [].

When DoW representatives and foreign officials discuss or correspond about developing plans, programs and related data, they do so on the mutual understanding that those discussions neither constitute nor imply any commitment by the U.S. Government [SAMM ].

References

SAMM

Public authorities

  • 10 U.S.C. §383: 10 U.S.C. §383, Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of programs and activities
  • 10 U.S.C. §333: 10 U.S.C. §333, Foreign security forces: authority to build capacity
  • 22 U.S.C. §3927: Foreign Service Act of 1980, §207 (22 U.S.C. §3927), Chief of mission
  • 50 U.S.C. §3021: National Security Act of 1947, as amended, §101 (50 U.S.C. §3021), National Security Council
  • DoDI 5132.14: DoD Instruction 5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, 13 January 2017

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