Which weapons have their own rules in U.S. arms sales?

Weapons-specific legislation is a set of statutory provisions that restrict the sale of specific types of weapons to particular countries.

The first such weapons-specific provision was introduced in FY 1987 when Congress placed a ban on the sale of depleted uranium (DU) anti-tank shells to any country other than NATO member countries and the major non-NATO allies. This prohibition has been renewed annually through FY 1995 by Congress. However, in FY 1992, Taiwan was added to the list of exempted countries. FY 1996 legislation did not renew DU round restriction. However, P.L. 104-164 amended the FAA to reflect the DU round sales restriction and permanently exempting the NATO countries, MNNAs, Taiwan, and any country the President determines that such a sale is in the U.S. national security to do so [Section 620J, FAA].

A second weapons-specific statute was introduced in FY 1988 when Congress prohibited the U.S. from selling or otherwise making available STINGER man-portable air defense missiles to any country in the Persian Gulf region, other than Bahrain. This provision had also been renewed annually by Congress through FY 1999 [Section 530, P.L. 106-113]. However, effective with enactment on 6 October 2000, Section 705, P.L. 106-280, provides an exception to the prohibition. A one-for-one transfer of STINGERs is authorized to any Persian Gulf country if the missile to be replaced is nearing the scheduled expiration of its shelf life.

Another type of armaments regulation was introduced in the NDAA, FY 1991, P.L. 101-510, Section 1703, which added to Chapter 7 of the AECA, entitled, “Control of Missiles and Missile Equipment or Technology.” This legislation reflects the provisions of a 16 April 1987 international statement, referred to as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), in which seven countries— United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan—agreed to restrict the international transfer of sensitive missile equipment and technology. Its membership has since grown, and all its members have agreed to limit the export of missiles and related technology that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Under the provisions of Chapter 7, sanctions may be applied against persons, defined to include individuals, corporations, and countries, regardless of membership in MTCR, which unlawfully transfer such equipment or technology. The sanctions range from the denial of USG contracts relating to missile equipment or technology, the denial of all USG contracts, and the denial of all U.S. export licenses and agreements involving items on the USML. Countries in violation of the MTCR, regardless of being a signatory, may be prohibited from receiving foreign assistance or denied from buying further arms from the U.S. A waiver of these sanctions may be granted if the President determines and notifies Congress that such a waiver is either of the following:

• Essential to the national security of the U.S.
• The offender is a sole source supplier of the product or service, and the product or service is not available from any alternative reliable producer, and the need for the product or service cannot be met in a timely manner by improved manufacturing processes or technological developments [Sections 73(e) and (g), AECA]

A similar regulatory program involving the transfer of chemical and biological (C/B) weapons was introduced in 1991 with the passage of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1992 and 1993. This legislation added Chapter 8 to the AECA, entitled, “Chemical or Biological Weapons Proliferation,” and mandates a variety of sanctions that the U.S. may take against persons, companies, and countries that unlawfully aid in the transfer of the illegal use of C/B weapons. The sanctions range from the denial of USG procurement contracts for a company that knowingly and materially contributed to the unlawful transfer of C/B weapons/technology to the termination of all U.S. foreign assistance to a government that has used such weapons. A Presidential waiver of such sanctions is authorized when such a waiver is either essential to U.S. national security interests or there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the foreign government [Section 505(b), P.L. 102-138].

In a unique action, the NDAA, FY 1993 established a one-year moratorium on the transfer of anti-personnel land mines [Section 1365, P.L. 102-484]. This legislation was proposed to serve as an interim step in obtaining an international agreement for prohibiting the sale, transfer, or export of these weapons and limiting their use, production, possession, and deployment. This legislation specifically prohibits sales, the financing of sales, commercial exports, the issuing of licenses for the export of such land mines, or the furnishing of any foreign assistance related to the transfer of such land mines during the period 23 October 1992 through 22 October 1993 [Section 1365(c), P.L. 102-484].

Subsequent annual legislation extended the moratorium to 23 October 2014 [Section 634(j), P.L. 110-161], and provided the permanent authority for the grant transfer of demining equipment available from the USAID or DOS [Section 7054(a), P.L.112-74]. The command-detonated claymore mine has been legislatively defined as not an anti-personnel land mine [Section 580(b)(2), P.L. 104-107].

Beginning in FY 2008, the transfer of cluster munitions or its technology shall not take place unless the sub-munitions, after arming, do not result in more than one percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments. The transfer agreement must also specify that the munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians [Section 646(b), P.L. 110-161].