FMS EdgeFMS Edge — home

Guide

Which weapons have their own rules in U.S. arms sales?

Updated 26 October 2026Checked against the SAMM: 26 October 2026

Depleted uranium anti-tank rounds may be sold only to North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, Major Non- Allies, Taiwan and countries covered by a Presidential determination. No one in the enterprise may discuss man-portable air defense systems or landmines with a potential buyer without the 's approval first. Cluster munitions need a legal minimum functioning rate and an agreement to use them only against clearly defined military targets; missile technology and chemical and biological weapons fall under chapters that sanction unlawful transfers.

Which weapons have their own rules in U.S. arms sales?

Weapons-specific legislation is a set of statutory provisions that restrict the sale of specific types of weapons to particular countries.

Depleted uranium anti-tank rounds

The first such weapons-specific provision was introduced in fiscal year () 1987 when Congress placed a ban on the sale of depleted uranium (DU) anti-tank shells to any country other than North Atlantic Treaty Organization () member countries and the major non- allies (). This prohibition has been renewed annually through 1995 by Congress. However, in 1992, Taiwan was added to the list of exempted countries. 1996 legislation did not renew DU round restriction. However, P.L. 104-164 amended the Foreign Assistance Act () to reflect the DU round sales restriction and permanently exempting the countries, , Taiwan, and any country for which the President determines that such a sale is in the U.S. national security interest [].

Section 620J of the allows the sale of M-833 depleted uranium ammunition, and of comparable anti-tank rounds with a depleted uranium penetrating component, to member countries, and countries covered by a completed Presidential national security interest determination. Presidential Determination () No. 94-37 of July 19, 1994, is such a determination. It covers Bahrain and Saudi Arabia for the M-833 round, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for the M-829 round. The Office of International Operations, Weapons Directorate (/WPN) should issue a Advisory for articles of a sensitive nature, under Section C5.2.6.1. Chapter 3 covers how to submit a request. The approval must be in place before the case's congressional notification (see Table C5.T22) [SAMM ].

Stinger and other man-portable air defense systems

Transfers of U.S.-origin Man-Portable Air Defense Systems () and their components depend on the recipient's ability and commitment to apply security and accountability controls at least equivalent to those the United States uses, and those controls go beyond the elements the Wassenaar Arrangement sets for export controls. Every organization in the () enterprise and its personnel, the Military Departments () and Organizations () included, must get specific approval from (/WPN) before any discussion of with any potential purchaser. The requirement covers discussion of sales of replacement batteries, parts, components or expendables for , and it stands even for countries already sold or approved for sales (see Table C5.T1E) [SAMM ].

A second weapons-specific statute was introduced in 1988 when Congress prohibited the U.S. from selling or otherwise making available STINGER man-portable air defense missiles to any country in the Persian Gulf region, other than Bahrain. This provision had also been renewed annually by Congress through 1999 [Section 530, P.L. 106-113]. However, effective with enactment on 6 October 2000, Section 705, P.L. 106-280, provides an exception to the prohibition. A one-for-one transfer of STINGERs is authorized to any Persian Gulf country if the missile to be replaced is nearing the scheduled expiration of its shelf life.

Missile technology

Another type of armaments regulation was introduced in the National Defense Authorization Act (), 1991, P.L. 101-510, Section 1703, which added to Chapter 7 of the , entitled, “Control of Missiles and Missile Equipment or Technology.” This legislation reflects the provisions of a 16 April 1987 international statement, referred to as the Missile Technology Control Regime (), in which seven countries (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan) agreed to restrict the international transfer of sensitive missile equipment and technology. Its membership has since grown, and all its members have agreed to limit the export of missiles and related technology that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Under Chapter 7, the President shall impose sanctions on a foreign person (an individual, a company, or certain government entities) that knowingly exports, transfers or trades equipment or technology contributing to missile programs in a country that is not an adherent. The sanctions range from the denial of U.S. Government () contracts relating to missile equipment or technology, the denial of all contracts, and the denial of licenses for all items on the U.S. (), to a ban on importing the person's products [, ]. A waiver of these sanctions may be granted if the President determines and notifies Congress that such a waiver is either of the following [, ]:

  • Essential to the national security of the U.S.
  • Essential to U.S. national security for a product or service of which the offender is the sole source supplier, where no alternative reliable producer has it and improved manufacturing processes or technological developments cannot meet the need in time []

On receiving an , and before the is developed, the Program Office, Program Manager or equivalent will perform a technical review of it to identify the -controlled items it holds or that the program is expected to include. Where an actionable asks for a Category I unmanned aerial system as the Annex defines it, that office will give the Department of State's Office of Regional Security and advance notice in an Advisory. The advisory goes with the and names the end user, the system and the quantity. While the Department of War reviews the request and develops the case, that office will refer the to the Missile Technology Export Control (MTEC) working group. The working group's nonproliferation pre-assessment informs the review under the Conventional Arms Transfer policy. The 's point of contact keeps the advisory and any reply in the case file. It sends an updated advisory if the end user, the system configuration or the quantity changes materially before the is offered [SAMM ].

The point of contact should carry on with case development during the MTEC review and assume the working group's approval, unless contacts the after the . MTEC approval is required before the is offered. does not have to obtain it before sending the final congressional notification package for such a system, and under the the are still required to identify -related articles in the transmittal records for congressional notification [SAMM ]. A notification that includes Category I articles falls in Tier 3 of the Tiered Review, with a period of 40 days [SAMM ].

Chemical and biological weapons

A similar regulatory program involving the transfer of chemical and biological (C/B) weapons was introduced in 1991 with the passage of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1992 and 1993. This legislation added Chapter 8 to the , entitled, “Chemical or Biological Weapons Proliferation.” Under Chapter 8, the President shall impose sanctions on a foreign person that has knowingly and materially contributed to the efforts of a foreign country, project or entity the section describes to use, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire C/B weapons, except as its subsection (b)(2) provides []. Sanctions against a government rest on a separate statute, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. When the President determines that the government of a foreign country has used C/B weapons in violation of international law, or has used lethal C/B weapons against its own nationals, the U.S. Government shall terminate assistance to that country under the . Urgent and food or other agricultural commodities are excepted. Sanctions on arms sales, arms sales financing, U.S. Government credit and exports of national security-sensitive goods and technology follow []. The President may waive these sanctions on certifying to Congress that the waiver is essential to the national security interests of the United States. The President may also waive them where there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of that government. Congress is notified in advance in either case [].

Anti-personnel landmines

All personnel and other Department of War personnel, including the , must get specific approval from (/WPN) before any discussion of landmines with any potential purchaser [SAMM ].

In a unique action, the , 1993 established a one-year moratorium on the transfer of anti-personnel land mines [Section 1365, P.L. 102-484]. This legislation was proposed to serve as an interim step in obtaining an international agreement for prohibiting the sale, transfer, or export of these weapons and limiting their use, production, possession, and deployment. This legislation specifically prohibits sales, the financing of sales, commercial exports, the issuing of licenses for the export of such land mines, or the furnishing of any foreign assistance related to the transfer of such land mines during the period 23 October 1992 through 22 October 1993 [Section 1365(c), P.L. 102-484].

Subsequent annual legislation extended the moratorium to 23 October 2014 [Section 634(j), P.L. 110-161], and provided the permanent authority for the grant transfer of demining equipment available from the U.S. Agency for International Development or the Department of State [Section 7054(a), P.L.112-74]. The command-detonated claymore mine has been legislatively defined as not an anti-personnel land mine [Section 580(b)(2), P.L. 104-107].

Cluster munitions

Section 7056(b) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), sets two conditions on cluster munitions and cluster munitions technology. No military assistance will be furnished for them, no defense export license for them may be issued, and none will be sold or transferred, unless the submunitions have a 99 percent or higher functioning rate. The agreement that applies to the assistance, transfer or sale must also specify that the cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present [SAMM ].

Appendix 6 gives the note for cluster munitions whose submunitions have a confirmed tested rate of 99 percent or higher. A cluster munition is a munition made of a non-reusable canister or delivery body that contains multiple conventional explosive submunitions. The definition covers systems delivered by artillery, mortars, tanks, rocket launchers, naval guns, missiles or cruise missiles that deploy payloads of explosive submunitions which detonate by target acquisition, impact or altitude, or which self-destruct, or a combination of both. Cluster munitions technology includes, among other things, the parts, components, attachments, accessories, software, firmware or other related of cluster munitions. Technology for clearing or disarming unexploded cluster munitions is outside the restriction [SAMM ].

References

SAMM

Public authorities

  • FAA §620J: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, §620J (22 U.S.C. §2378a), Depleted uranium ammunition
  • AECA §73: Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, §73 (22 U.S.C. §2797b), Transfers of missile equipment or technology by foreign persons
  • AECA §74: Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, §74 (22 U.S.C. §2797c), Definitions (Chapter 7, control of missiles and missile equipment or technology)
  • AECA §81: Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, §81 (22 U.S.C. §2798), Sanctions against certain foreign persons (AECA chapter 8, Chemical or biological weapons proliferation)
  • 22 U.S.C. §5605: 22 U.S.C. §5605, Sanctions against use of chemical or biological weapons (Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-182, title III, §307)

Facts referenced

DSCA policy memoranda

  • DSCA 26-124: Updates to Missile Technology Control Regime Guidance [SAMM E-Change 886]

Related